While the focus in the Bitcoin world is often primarily on the price, political developments are taking place in the background that may be much more significant in the long term. In the US, the Senate passed an important procedural step towards a legislative package at the beginning of March 2026 with a large bipartisan majority, which would also include a ban on the Federal Reserve’s CBDC by the end of 2030. The corresponding Senate procedure of March 4, 2026 was adopted by 90 votes to 8. This is not yet the same as a final, stand-alone CBDC ban, but it is a clear political signal: in the US, resistance to state-owned digital central bank money is growing visibly and across party lines.

This is remarkable for Europe. Because while the USA is clearly distancing itself from a retail CBDC, at least politically, the European Union is continuing to work on the digital euro. The Council of the EU adopted its negotiating position on December 19, 2025, thus preparing the next political step for a possible introduction. The reasons given for this include strategic autonomy, economic security and the resilience of European payment transactions.

This raises a central question that has rarely been openly discussed in Europe to date: Does Europe really need the digital euro – or have there long been more free-market, liberal and innovative alternatives?

The US development is a warning signal for Europe

The development in the USA shows one thing above all: a highly developed economy can come to the conclusion that digital money does not necessarily have to be delivered directly to citizens by the state. The scepticism towards a CBDC there stems from concerns about surveillance, the potential political controllability of payments and the further centralization of money-related infrastructure. From the perspective of civil rights and financial self-determination in particular, this is an issue that goes far beyond technical questions.

In Europe, too, this debate should not be shortened in a technocratic way. After all, the digital euro is not just about a new form of payment. It is about the future architecture of the monetary system: Who controls the infrastructure? Who can set the rules? Who sees which data? And what role will the state play directly in the payment transactions of citizens and companies in the future? These questions are too important politically and socially to treat the digital euro merely as a seemingly neutral step towards modernization.

The digital euro is not just an update of existing payments

Proponents of the digital euro argue that Europe needs a public digital means of payment to complement cash. The ECB presents the digital euro as a secure, private and free-to-use electronic means of payment that can be used anywhere in the eurozone. It also emphasizes data protection and refers in particular to an offline function in which only the payer and recipient should know the details of the payment.

These commitments are politically important. But they do not eliminate the fundamental question of whether Europe needs a new form of state digital central bank money for end users at all. Because even if the digital euro were initially introduced with strict limits, protection mechanisms and promises of data protection, this would create a new monetary policy and technical infrastructure. And every infrastructure that is created changes the balance of power in the long term. What is sold today as a data-saving addition could be politically expanded, technically adapted or tightened up by regulation tomorrow. This is precisely why skepticism towards CBDCs is not backward-looking, but reasonable in terms of democratic theory.

Euro stablecoins: a market-based alternative to the digital euro

Anyone who wants to conduct the debate properly must recognize one crucial point: Europe does not lack a legal framework for stablecoins. With the MiCA Regulation, the EU has already created a harmonized regulatory framework for crypto assets. Among other things, MiCA distinguishes between asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens. A euro stablecoin is typically classified as an e-money token. Such tokens are already subject to specific requirements regarding authorization, supervision, whitepaper obligations, redemption at par value and reserve requirements.

This is precisely why euro stablecoins deserve much more attention in the debate about the future of digital money. This is because they show that Europe does not necessarily have to rely on a digital euro as a state central bank solution in order to make digital, euro-based money usable. A regulated euro stablecoin can fulfill the same basic idea: digital money based on the euro, usable in digital applications and modern payment transactions – but not as a state-provided CBDC, but as a market-based solution within an existing regulatory framework.

This shifts the real political question. It is no longer a question of whether Europe can enable digital euro money. Europe can already do that. The decisive question is rather which path Europe wants to choose: a digital euro as a state infrastructure or euro stablecoins as a privately issued, regulated and competitively organized alternative.

From this perspective, euro stablecoins are not just an addition to the debate, but a real alternative to the digital euro. If Europe has already created the conditions for supervised private providers to develop digital euro solutions with MiCA, then the introduction of a state CBDC must be particularly well justified. Because where a functioning, regulated and innovation-friendly alternative exists, state intervention is not automatically the better answer.

Bitcoin opens up a third perspective

In addition to CBDC and stablecoin, there is another perspective that is often underestimated in the European debate: Bitcoin. Bitcoin is neither state money nor a debt instrument against an issuer. For this very reason, Bitcoin offers an alternative to centralized digital money systems. Bitcoin shows that digital money, digital settlement and global transferability are also possible without centralized state control. This perspective is important for the discussion about the digital euro because it breaks down the apparent lack of alternatives to state solutions. Bitcoin is a reminder that digitalization does not automatically have to mean centralization. This is not a regulatory fact, but the political and economic classification of system differences.

Of course, Bitcoin will not completely replace the euro in everyday payments in the short term. But as a neutral settlement layer and a free reference point, Bitcoin is highly relevant. Anyone talking about the future of money should therefore not just choose between bank deposits and central bank apps. The real question for the future is: do we want a digital monetary system that is more open, more competitive and more resilient – or one in which the state grows deeper into the infrastructure of everyday payments than before?

Europe’s digital future does not need state over-infrastructure

The EU justifies the digital euro with sovereignty, resilience and supplementing cash. These goals are legitimate. But it does not automatically follow from them that a CBDC is the best answer. If Europe wants to protect cash, it should strengthen cash legally and practically. If Europe wants digital sovereignty, it should promote open European payment networks, regulated euro stablecoins and innovation-friendly markets. And if Europe takes freedom and data protection seriously, it should examine very carefully whether a state digital currency is really the right way forward.

The US development in particular should give Europe pause for thought. If even the world’s largest economy is developing considerable political reservations about a CBDC, then Europe should not pretend that the digital euro is merely a technical upgrade. It is a fundamental decision about the relationship between the state, money and citizens.

Conclusion

The debate must not be narrowed down to the wrong alternative. It is not just about the choice between today’s payment transactions and the digital euro. With MiCA, Europe has already created a legal framework for euro stablecoins. At the same time, Bitcoin is an open, state-independent digital money system. This is precisely why the question must be allowed: Why does Europe also need a CBDC?

Developments in the USA are an opportunity to ask this question seriously. Not against digitalization. But rather for a digital monetary order that prioritizes freedom, competition and decentralization over state control. Europe’s future must be digital. But it does not have to be centralized.